PDF Ebook The Rise of European Security Cooperation, by Seth G. Jones
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The Rise of European Security Cooperation, by Seth G. Jones
PDF Ebook The Rise of European Security Cooperation, by Seth G. Jones
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One of the most striking developments in recent international politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in the security realm to increase their ability to project power abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe whilst building power abroad.
- Sales Rank: #3764241 in Books
- Published on: 2007-02-12
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.98" h x .71" w x 5.98" l, 1.10 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 310 pages
Review
"A political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Jones takes issue with the widespread view (particularly prevalent in the United States) that European security cooperation has been a failure. Thoroughly examining post-Cold War European cooperation on security institutions, economic sanctions, arms production, and military forces, he argues that such skepticism is misplaced: European security cooperation is 'one of the most striking developments in international politics today.'"
Philip H. Gordon, Foreign Affairs
"...both books contribute to the understanding of European foreign policy, and schoalrs working in this area will profit from reading them." --Richard G. Whitman, University of Bath.
About the Author
Seth G. Jones is Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He is a distinguished scholar of European affairs, state-building operations and counterterrorism. Professor Jones was Europe Editor at The Christian Science Monitor, is a contributor to The New York Times, The Financial Times, and National Interest and has appeared on the BBC, CNN and other national and international television and radio programs.
Most helpful customer reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful.
Simplistic
By G D
This is an extraordinarily well-researched and neatly presented book, which convincingly illustrates the rise of European defense capabilities in the last two decades. The explanatory thesis, however, is just classic neo-realism: change in the international system has caused Europe to seek defense autonomy in order to compete with the United States. Jones consistently acknowledges the impossibility of ranking explanations, yet each chapter claims that the structural argument is the most convincing compared to domestic, institutionalist, and constructivist alternatives. The constructivist alternative explanation is particularly underdeveloped; Jones rejects constructivism because there is no way to empirically measure a change in European identity, but that is not the type of explanation constructivists would offer. There is no discussion of how the significance of structural anarchy could be measured, just an unstated assumption that European decision-makers are looking to systemic structure when developing policy. As in most structural realist work, the author's systemic level of analysis glosses over the unit-level 'reality' of what may actually be taking place. Thus, we have a thoroughly-researched, well-organized book with an overly-simplistic, limited theoretical explanation.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
Another realist argument with the usual weaknesses, but at least it has decent data collection
By Leanne Powner
Jones’ thoroughly researched book suffers from two significant weaknesses: the usual weaknesses inherent in arguing for structural theories as causes, and insufficient attention to research design in some aspects of the book.
First, structural theories in general lack microfoundations. They are about general pressures that states face. By definition, they do not provide reasons for specific actors taking specific actions; they merely provide predispositions and constraints on behavior. They argue as well that actors are effectively irrelevant: that all states in similar positions in the global hierarchy should have similar preferences, and therefore that individual leaders and substate interests are irrelevant to explaining security policy. Jones attempts to get around this by arguing that in security policy states are (or can be considered) unitary actors. This is to some extent plausible, but it assumes that no other actors are capable of having an influence on state actors and that the identity of leaders themselves does not matter. Significant evidence exists to the contrary on the latter point, especially regarding Blair’s decision to move forward with security cooperation at St. Malo. In the British case as well, private firms enjoy much more influence with the government than in most other corporatist or similar political economies; Jones glosses over these known differences without acknowledging them or providing sufficient evidence for his claims that firms weren’t important to the international collaboration decisions. To choose another pair of convenient examples, the dissention in the British Conservative party leading up to the Maastricht Treaty, and in the Labor Party leading up to St Malo, are also conveniently absent. If states were plausibly treated as unitary actors and billiard balls that would all respond the same no matter the leader, then we should see very little internal dissent on security issues especially. The omission of this information presents an unfair picture of the actual state of British politics during the critical period.
Second, insufficient attention is paid to research design issues. Yes, Jones avoids the “N of 1” problem, as he notes in Chapter 1. But what Jones does not do is establish clear coding rules or criteria for determining what constitutes a ‘case.’ The latter problem is particularly evident in the chapter on security institutions. It’s not clear why the creation of EPC constitutes an institution according to his own definition (p 58); this is particularly true if EPC was, as Jones claims, little more than a talking shop. It’s also not clear why the creation of CFSP is not treated as a separate observation from the later developments – for example, to create ESDP. By Jones’ own definition of an institution, Nice and Amsterdam (especially) should have constituted separate observations. By introducing new tools and issue areas, they very explicitly change (or introduce new) rules about how states are expected to behave. While there is some justification for stopping the selection of ‘observations’/cases after the creation of an institution (after the DV = 1, as in some type of implicit hazard/survival analysis), these cases could have shed a significant amount of light on the issue of how states cooperate (see below). They would, however, weaken the claim that structural changes are necessary since the international system did not continue to shift during the 1990s in a way that would explain the additional changes in his dependent variable. Case selection rules, here, or the lack thereof, clearly bias the results in favor of Jones’ core argument.
Jones could also have strengthened his argument considerably by extending it from simply predicting whether cooperation takes place to predicting what form it takes. Structural theories barely predict cooperation; in fact, most structural theories argue that cooperation, on the rare occasions that it occurs, should be minimally invasive and centered strictly on the achieving of obvious mutual gains in low-stakes issues. States should also evince significant concerns about partners’ possible defection from cooperation. Defection costs states the gains from cooperation as well as imposing a ‘sucker’s payoff’ incorporating a cost of constraining oneself in the cooperative behavior while the partner pursues his own private interest. One would think that in security cooperation these fears would be particularly salient. This entire line of (neo)realist theorizing about institutions and cooperation is fully absent from the book. Beyond the issue of cooperation on sanctioning, how did states ensure that firms collaborated and that the benefits were shared equally, and that the benefits accrued to them, the states, rather than solely to the private firms?
Finally, in a lesser issue, Jones omits several alternative possibilities that are more consistent with liberal theory. In addition to unilateralism, NATO, and a (new) European option, states had the option of revising existing institutions like the WEU and CSCE/OSCE. Failure to consider these options also weakens Jones’ argument by pitting unilateralism and bandwagoning against the highest hurdle, institutional creation.
Overall, for a structural argument this book is rather well done. If you MUST write a structuralist dissertation, you could do a lot worse than to model it on this book. It does, however, fall prey to a number of weaknesses in research design that weaken it significantly. If you’re going to use macro theories to explain meso behavior, or any other cross-level things, you’ve got a lot of risk of ecological fallacy and worse. These circumstances require paying vastly more attention to careful design than the average same-level analysis. A considerable amount of data collection went into this book, but all the data collection in the world won’t rescue a weak design.
1 of 3 people found the following review helpful.
Excellent Book
By Alex Knightly
This is the best book on European security I have ever read. It is a bit academic, but is still eminently readable. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is its argument that Europe is becoming a major competitor of the United States in the security realm. The evidence is much stronger than most people realize.
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